Monetary harmonization in Southern Africa by Chipeta, C. & Mkandawire, M.L.C.
NOVEMBER 1994 
RESEARCH PAPER THIRTY 
MONETARY HARMONIZATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
C. CHIPETA 
and 
M. L. C. MKANDAWIRE 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
CONSORTIUM POUR LA RECHERCHE ECONOMIQUE EN AFRIQUE 
Monetary harmonization 
in Southern Africa 
Other publications in the AERC Research Paper Series: 
Structural Adjustment Programmes and the Coffee Sector in Uganda by Germina Ssemogerere, 
Research Paper 1. 
Real Interest Rates and the Mobilization of Private Savings in Africa by F.M. Mwega, S.M. Ngola 
and N. Mwangi, Research Paper 2. 
Mobilizing Domestic Resources for Capital Formation in Ghana: the Role of Informal Financial 
Markets by Ernest Aryeetey and Fritz Gockel, Research Paper 3. 
The Informal Financial Sector and Macroeconomic Adjustment in Malawi by C. Chipeta and 
M.L.C. Mkandawire, Research Paper 4. 
The Effects ofNon-Bank Financial Intermediaries on Demandfor Money in Kenya by S.M. Ndele, 
Research Paper 5. 
Exchange Rate Policy and Macroeconomic Performance in Ghana by C.D. Jebuni, N.K. Sowa and 
K.S. Tutu, Research Paper 6. 
A Macroeconomic-Demographic Model for Ethiopia by Asmerom Kidane, Research Paper 7. 
Macroeconomic Approach to External Debt: the Case of Nigeria by S.I. Ajayi, Research Paper 8. 
The Real Exchange Rate and Ghana's Agricultural Exports by K. Yerfi Fosu, Research Paper 9. 
The Relationship Between the Formal and Informal Sectors of the Financial Market in Ghana by 
E. Aryeetey, Research Paper 10. 
Financial System Regulation, Deregulation and Savings Mobilization in Nigeria by A. Soyibo and 
F. Adekanye, Research Paper 11. 
The Savings-Investment Process in Nigeria: an Empirical Study of the Supply Side by A. Soyibo, 
Research Paper 12. 
Growth and Foreign Debt: the Ethiopian Experience, 1964-86 by B. Degefe, Research Paper 13. 
Links Between the informal and Formal/Semi-Formal Financial Sectors in Malawi by C. Chipeta 
and M.L.C. Mkandawire, Research Paper 14. 
The Determinants of Fiscal Deficit and Fiscal Adjustment in Cote d'lvoire by O. Kouassy and B. 
Bohoun, Research Paper 15. 
Small and Medium-Scale Enterprise Development in Nigeria by D.E. Ekpenyong and M.O. 
Nyong, Research Paper 16. 
The Nigerian Banking System in the Context of Policies of Financial Regulation and Deregulation 
by A. Soyibo and F. Adekanye, Research Paper 17. 
Scope, Structure and Policy Implications of Informal Financial Markets in Tanzania by M. Hyuha, 
O. Ndanshau and J.P. Kipokola, Research Paper 18. 
European Economic Integration and the Franc Zone: the Future of the CFA Franc after 1996. Part 
I: Historical Background and a New Evaluation of Monetary Co-operation in the CFA 
Countries by Allechi M'bet and Madeleine Niamkey, Research paper 19. 
Revenue Productivity Implications of Tax Reform in Tanzania by N. E. Osoro, Research Paper 20. 
The Informal and Semi-Formal Sectors in Ethiopia: a Study of the Iqqub, Iddir and Savings and 
Credit Co-operatives by Dejene Aredo, Research Paper 21. 
Inflationary Trends and Control in Ghana by N. K. Sowa and J. K. Kwakye, Research Paper 22. 
Macroeconomic Constraints and Medium-Term Growth in Kenya: A Three-Gap Analysis by F. 
M. Mwega, N. Mwangi and K. Olewe-Ochilo, Research Paper 23. 
The Foreign Exchange Market and the Dutch Auction System in Ghana by Cletus K. Dordunoo, 
Research Paper 24. 
Exchange Rate Depreciation and the Structure of Sectoral Prices in Nigeria Under an Alternative 
Pricing Regime, 1986-89 by Olu Ajakaiye and Ode Ojowu, Research Paper 25. 
Exchange Rate Depreciation, Budget Deficit and Inflation - the Nigerian Experience by 
F. O. Egwaikhide, L. N. Chete, and G. O. Falokun, Research Paper 26. 
Trade, Payments Liberalization and Economic Performance in Ghana by C. D. Jebuni, 
A. D. Oduro and K. A. Tutu, Research Paper 27. 
Constraints to the Development and Diversification of Non-traditional Exports in Uganda, 
1981-90 by G. N. Ssemogerere and L. A. Kasekende, Research Paper 28. 
Indices of Effective Exchange Rates: A Comparative Study of Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan by 
Asmerom Kidane, Research Paper 29. 
Monetary harmonization 
in Southern Africa 
C. Chipeta 
Department of Economics 
Chancellor College 
P.O. Box 280 
Zomba, Malawi 
and 
M.L.C. Mkandawire 
National Bank of Malawi 
AERC Research Paper 30 
African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi 
November 1994 
© African Economic Research Consortium, 1994 
Published by theAfrican Economic Research Consortium 
P.O. Box 62882 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
Printed by The Regal Press Kenya Ltd. 
P .O.Box 46166 
Nairobi, Kenya 
ISBN 9966-900-17-9 
Contents 
List of tables 
List of abbreviations 
Acknowledgements 
I Introduction 1 
II Review of the literature 3 
III Past and current interest in monetary harmonization 8 
IV Alternative models of monetary integration 17 
VI Problems on the road towards monetary harmonization 30 
VI Conclusions 33 
Appendix 1. Monetary unions in Southern Africa 36 
Appendix 2. Tables 43 
Notes 47 
References 48 
List of tables 
1. Intra-SADC trade 1981/86 11 
2. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade 12 
3. Southern African countries: distribution of gross 
domestic product (%) 12 
4. Southern Africa: structure of merchandise exports 
(% of total) 13 
5. Southern Africa: maximum, minimum and mean 
rates of inflation (%) 14 
6. Southern Africa: maximum, minimum and mean 
per capita GNP (US $) 14 
7 The relative sizes of Southern African Economies 15 
8 Some transaction costs of Malawi's foreign trade 25 
9 Malawi's foreign trade 27 
10 Malawi government recurrent account revenue (K'000) 29 
11 Ratio of parallel market to official exchange rates 29 
A. 1 Exchange rates and exchange arrangements in 
Southern Africa, 30th June, 1992 43 
A.2 Comparative exchange rate performance in SADC 
member states 1965-1990 44 
A.3 State of exchange rate disparities between member 
states and required adjustments back to equilibrium 45 
A.4 Estimated levels of stable central bank credit to 
central government 45 
A.5 Central bank credit to central government 46 
List of abbreviations 
CAMA Central African Monetary Area 
CM A Common Monetary Area 
COSATU Confederation of Southern African Trade Union 
EMS European monetary system 
ERM Exchange rate mechanism 
EAU European Unit of Account 
SATUCC Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council 
WAU West African Monetary Union 
, suwfedgements 
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the African Economi* 
Research Consortium (AERC) for funding their research. They would also like t( 
thank the Research Coordinator of AERC, as well as resource persons am 
colleagues in the macroeconomic research network for the many helpful comment 
and suggestions that they received during the course of the research for this pace ' 
However, the authors alone bear responsibility for its contents. 
I Introduction 
At its 1991 Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania, the authority of SADC 1 decided that 
the organisation should embark on macroeconomic and sectoral policy planning 
and coordination. As pointed out by the organisation's Executive Secretary in 
January, 1992, during the Annual Consultative meeting held in Maputo, 
Mozambique, macroeconomic policy planning and coordination will include the 
creation of a monetary union. 
All member states of SADC, except Botswana, are also members of the 
Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). 2 According to its 
Treaty, the aim of the PTA is to promote cooperation and development in all fields 
of economic activity, including monetary affairs. Monetary cooperation has been 
interpreted to include establishing a common monetary area with a greater 
measure of monetary stability in order to facilitate economic integration. To this 
end, the authority of the PTA decided in 1990 that the organisation should work 
towards the establishment of a single currency by the year 2000. 
Southern Africa already has one monetary harmonization scheme - the Common 
Currency Area covering South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
Mozambique has openly expressed interest in joining this currency area. Other 
countries would like to see the rand become the common currency of Southern 
Africa. 
Objectives 
As interest in the formation of a monetary union in the region grows, naturally 
questions are being asked about the conditions under which a monetary union 
would be desirable and viable, the desirable form and extent of such a monetary 
union, the effects and implications of a monetary union for independence in 
national policy-making, and about the implications of economic disparities among 
member countries, among other things. In order to address these issues, this study 
will do the following things: 
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(i) Review the general literature on monetary integration. 
(ii) Present the relevant empirical and historical background to monetary 
integration in Southern Africa. 
(iii) Examine alternative models of monetary integration, their suitability for the 
Southern Africa region, and the stages involved in reaching the ultimate 
goals. 
(i v) Analyze the costs and benefits of monetary union under alternative regimes 
to Malawi, paying attention to trade policy, fiscal policy, and the effects of 
exchange rate alignment. 
II Review of the literature 
A monetary union has been defined as an area within which exchange rates bear 
a permanently fixed relationship to each other. A monetary union with ostensibly 
fixed exchange rates, but without integration of economic policies, a common pool 
of foreign exchange reserves, or a single central bank, has been termed a "pseudo 
exchange rate union" (Corden, 1972). A common feature of monetary unions is 
that either there must be a single currency, or, if there are several currencies, these 
currencies must be fully convertible one into the other at immutably fixed 
exchange rates, thereby effectively creating a single currency (Allen, 1976). 
In forming a monetary union, countries are often motivated by the desire to 
reduce transaction costs associated with the use of separate national currencies and 
to reduce the unfavourable effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade and 
investment. These potential benefits from a monetary union are conditional on the 
stability of the value of money, or on price stability. The widespread use of a 
common currency that is stable in value will minimise transaction costs. This 
argument has led to the call for a single international money or a global currency 
area (Cooper, 1990). 
Another important reason for forming a monetary union is to enhance the anti-
inflationary credibility of the monetary policy of member countries. The choice 
of monetary policy by individual countries is to a large extent conditioned by the 
choice of the exchange rate regime. If exchange rates are fixed vis a vis a dominant 
currency, member countries adopt monetary policies that are consistent with those 
of the country is suing the dominant currency. Reducing the independence of the 
domestic monetary authority in this way may enhance its anti-inflationary credibility 
provided that the monetary union is formed with a "hard" currency so that price 
stability is assured. This credibility gain for the non-German members of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) has until recently been an important feature of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System. 
Monetary policy in a monetary union can be managed under several alternative 
institutional arrangements. In the presence of a dominant country, that country's 
currency may or may not circulate in other countries. Either way, its central bank 
may set monetary policy for the whole union. The potential benefits to the other 
4 RESEARCH PAPER 3 0 
countries are maximised if that currency is the most stable in value. For a long time 
this has been the case among EMS members whose benefits have derived from the 
stability of the German mark, itself the by-product of the formal independence of 
the Bundesbank from the Ministry of Finance and its legal responsibility to ensure 
stability in the value of the currency. The non-South African members of the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) have not derived similar benefit from monetary 
union because of the instability in the value of the South African rand. 
Alternatively, monetary policy in a monetary union could be set by a supra-
national institution. In the CFA Franc Zone, composed of the West African 
Monetary Union (WAMU) and the Central African Monetary Area (CAMA), for 
example, the central bank of each area sets or co-ordinates monetary policy for the 
entire area. Given the nature of the exchange rate arrangement, the room to 
manoeuvre monetary policy is small. Future monetary cooperation in Europe will 
similarly entail the establishment of a European central bank. An effective 
commitment to price stability will be a key aim of this central bank. This aim will 
be enhanced by the independence of the central bank from national governments 
and by including a commitment to price stability in its statutes. 
The goal of price stability inevitably conflicts with an attempt to use monetary 
expansion to finance government expenditure as an alternative to raising revenue 
by the conventional forms of taxation. The tendency to employ expansionary 
monetary policies to increase economic activity or to generate revenue, is said to 
be strong among several economies (Barrow and Gordon, 1983; Gros, 1989). 
Seignorage, the benefit that accrues to the issuer of money by virtue of being able 
to issue interest-free currency rather than having to incur interest charges on 
borrowing, is justified in terms of the high collection costs and distorting effects 
of conventional taxes. However, there is no reason to believe that those factors 
outweigh the costs of high rates of inflation. 
The desirable extent of a monetary union has been the subject of many 
publications on "optimum currency areas". An optimum currency area is one 
where the advantages for internal trade of further expanding the area of fixed 
exchange rates are just balanced by the disadvantage of giving up the freedom to 
devalue and revalue. In other words, it is an area over which the net advantages 
of monetary cooperation are at an optimum. To maximise the net advantages, there 
must exist within the area labour mobility, wage/price flexibility, diversification 
of the economies of the member countries and a high degree of trade interdependence. 
Although the benefit of monetary exchange is enhanced by widening the area 
over which a single currency is used, there are reasons related to macroeconomic 
shocks which constrain the size of an optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961). It 
has been argued, for example, that unless labour and capital can freely move 
between regions, a decline in demand facing one region may lead to unemployment 
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unless there is flexibility of the nominal exchange rate. Assuming that wages and 
prices are sticky, then real exchange rate depreciation can be achieved only 
through a change in the nominal exchange rate. But depreciation would be out of 
the question if the two regions belonged to the same currency union. For an 
optimum currency area, therefore, factor mobility must be high. 
In practice, labour may not be as mobile between countries (even if they belong 
to the same currency union) as within the same country. Formal immigration 
restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions, social services and pensions that are not 
available to migrants, and language and cultural differences, may limit labour 
mobility. Mobility of finance capital may be high, but not that of physical capital. 
Concerning openness and regional interdependence, it has been asserted that 
the larger the volume of inter-regional trade within the common currency area, the 
larger the cost saving from the currency union (McKinnon, 1963). It has also been 
demonstrated that the usefulness of exchange rate flexibility to achieve external 
balance, without inducing large internal price changes, is larger when the economy 
is comparatively closed. In the face of a fall in demand for the country's exports, 
and assuming that the economy is at full employment, resources must be shifted 
from production of non-traded goods to production of traded goods to maintain 
external balance. If the non-traded goods sector is small, a large exchange rate 
adjustment is needed to transfer those resources. Consequently, the larger the 
resulting internal prices. Therefore, very open economies are suitable candidates 
for fixed exchange rates vis a vis their trading partners, including the formation of 
currency unions. 
The twelve EC countries meet this criterion. There is a high ratio of intra-EC 
trade compared to trade with non-EC trading partners. The United States and 
Canada also satisfy the trade criterion. There is a large amount of trade among 
states and provinces in the United States and Canada where the effect of currency 
unions has been to foster integration. In the CFA Franc Zone, trade among 
members of the union is relatively low. The currency union among Eastern 
Caribbean countries also shows only a small amount of intra-regional trade, with 
exports directed to non-union countries. In these two cases, the size of intra-
monetary union trade is not the major reason for currency union. Rather, it is the 
quest for monetary stability through a single monetary authority. 
The diversification or lack of diversification of a country's production structure 
determines the impact of an adverse shock on the economy. If a variety of goods 
are exported, and if shocks occur to supply or demand, then their impact on the 
whole economy will be less than the impact on individual industries. Therefore, 
other things remaining the same, a diversified economy has less need for exchange 
rate flexibility to deal with shocks. 
Wages and domestic output prices were assumed fixed, at least in the short run, 
in the early literature that considered the usefulness of exchange rate adjustment 
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for attaining internal and external balance. The usual approach now is to consider 
wages and prices as sticky rather than fixed and to expect this stickiness to decline 
in the long run. The response of wages and prices to nominal exchange rate 
changes may be large enough to reduce the value of nominal exchange rate changes 
as a means of adjustment. 
There are two types of wage/price flexibility worth considering: real and 
nominal. Changes in a nominal price like the exchange rate are a substitute for 
domestic price or wage changes and may facilitate real adjustment. But if there is 
real wage rigidity, employment and net exports would be unaffected by nominal 
exchange rate adjustments because such rigidity is the same thing as rigidity of the 
real exchange rate. In contrast, if real wages are perfectly flexible, modification 
of the nominal exchange rate is helpful as long as nominal wages are sticky. If 
nominal wages or prices are flexible enough to accomplish the task of changing 
real exchange rates, adjustment of the nominal exchange rate is not necessary. 
With respect to fiscal policy, national actions may have significant effects on 
other members of a monetary union. If so, there is need for policy coordination to 
internalise these externalities. The question arises as to the form that policy 
coordination should take to minimise unfavourable external effects. Much 
depends on the nature of the external effects. There are essentially two types: 
macroeconomic effects associated with stabilisation policy and external effects 
related to budget discipline and credibility of monetary policy. The first type of 
effect depends on the sign of the shock. The problem could be excessive budget 
deficits or over-contractionary fiscal policies. The second type of effect implies 
a sustained bias towards excessive deficits. Therefore, rules or institutionalised 
procedures that put ceilings on deficits may be the solution for the first type of 
effects, but not for the second. But both types of effects may be approached 
through coordination of fiscal policies in a flexible manner. Unfortunately, this 
relies on discretion. It may be put in place too late, it may be subject to 
misinterpretation, and it may be difficult to monitor. 
Issues of real and nominal economic convergence are also relevant to the 
discussion of monetary unions. That, in the long run, monetary union implies 
convergence of inflation rates because of convergence of monetary policy is 
obvious enough. What is not so obvious is whether real convergence is a 
prerequisite or a consequence of monetary integration. 
The argument that real convergence is a prerequisite for monetary and customs 
unions follows from the belief that location of economic activity is subject to 
centripetal forces arising from economic integration. Such forces might be due to 
positive external economies created in a highly industrialised centre (Myrdal, 
1957; Perroux, 1959). 
The alternative view, that closer economic and monetary integration will lead 
to greater real economic convergence, follows from the neo-classical view that the 
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free movement of goods and services in an exchange rate risk-free environment 
will lead to equalization of factor prices and output per capita. 
Two recent works contain some clarification of the issues involved in this 
debate (Krugman, 1990; and Krugman and Venables, 1990). These studies lend 
support to two conclusions: one, that centralization is more likely the greater the 
size of economies of scale and of the mobile manufacturing sector and, two, that 
centralization is less likely the greater the size and importance of transport costs. 
Another view that has been advanced is that monetary union is viable before 
nominal and real convergence. This view is based on two assumptions. The first 
is that free movement of goods and services in the absence of exchange risk will 
promote equalisation of factor prices and per capita output. In other words, 
integration will facilitate real convergence. The second is that in the long run there 
is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. As such, price stability can 
be pursued as a goal in its own right. In addition, if the supra-national monetary 
authority is committed to price stability, this alone may improve the trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment in the short run. On these grounds, inflation 
convergence is not accepted as a precondition for the formation of a monetary 
union. 
According to a recent study on this subject, neither theory nor experience 
identifies a unique level of nominal or real convergence as being associated with 
a successful monetary union. Each case must be judged on its own merits. The 
issue of how much convergence of nominal and real economic performance is 
needed before monetary union is established is at best controversial (Mason and 
Taylor, 1992). 
Ill Past and current interest in monetary 
harmonization in Southern Africa 
There has been monetary harmonization in Southern Africa earlier involving two 
groups of countries. One group comprised Malawi (then Nyasaland), Zambia 
(then Northern Rhodesia) and Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia). Their 
monetary cooperation took place during the colonial era and lasted two and a half 
decades from 1938 to 1964. The monetary cooperation essentially involved use 
of a common currency. Institutionally, this cooperation went through two phases: 
firstly, the currency board system, secondly, a common central bank when the 
three countries formed a Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which lasted one 
decade and was dissolved in 1963 when Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia won 
political independence from Britain; the central bank itself was dissolved the 
following year. 
In the case of the other group comprising South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland, their monetary cooperation was not abandoned when the 
last three won independence, also from Britain, or when Namibia got its 
independence. It continues to exist at present but without Botswana which pulled 
out in 1975. For many decades their cooperation was on an informal basis until 
an agreement was signed in 1974 formalizing the Rand Monetary Area; this was 
modified into a Common Monetary Area arrangement by a 1986 agreement. In 
this monetary cooperation the dominant partner has been South Africa, right from 
1921 when the Reserve Bank of South Africa was established, and the dominant 
currency has been the South African Rand since the time it was introduced in 1960. 
The monetary cooperation has been in two major forms: first, circulation of the 
Rand in pther member countries and, after the latter's independence, side by side 
with their national currencies; second a fixed exchange rate arrangement between 
their currencies (For further details, see Appendix 1). 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the monetary cooperation experience 
of the two groups of Southern African countries briefly surveyed above. Firstly, 
geographical proximity appears to have been one of the conducive factors to the 
selection of co-operating countries, as were similarities in their historical, economic 
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and political background. Secondly, political will and sovereignty were also 
conducive. These gave rise to the Central African Federation and the resultant 
monetary cooperation under expatriate rule, which was later demolished when 
political independence was achieved in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. 
Thirdly, gains from economic integration in favour of Zimbabwe, which was 
economically better off, were resented by the other members in the Federation just 
as Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland resent gains from the customs 
union in favour of South Africa. Fourthly, domination of the Common Monetary 
Area by South Africa whose inflation rate is imported by other partners and 
movements in whose interest rates are closed followed by interest rates in other 
partner countries is resented by Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. Loss of the use 
of the exchange rate as a tool of economic management is also resented by these 
countries. Inability to use the exchange rate as a policy applied to member 
countries of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well. 
There are three other principal disadvantages of a fixed exchange rate system 
from which the member countries of the Federation suffered and from which 
member countries of the Common Monetary Area other than South Africa still 
suffer. The first is that a fixed exchange rate gives rise to a need to finance a balance 
of payments disequilibrium. Since the price of the currency is not free to adjust 
continuously so as to equate demand for and supply of foreign exchange, an overall 
balance of payments deficit can occur. In order to finance the balance of payments 
deficit, there is need for the central bank to maintain reserves; while in order to 
avoid or minimise the external deficit, there is need for governments to formulate 
explicit objectives with regard to the balance of payments. 
The second is that adjustment in the balance of payments cannot be brought 
about automatically in the balance of payments. For example, if a country's 
exports are becoming uncompetitive because its price level is increasing faster 
than that of its trading partners, the resulting tendency for its balance of payments 
to move into deficit cannot be corrected by a downward movement in the country' s 
exchange rate. Instead, there will be need to manipulate the level of domestic 
demand or to place barriers on trade and payments in order to protect its external 
position. 
The third principal disadvantage of a fixed exchange rate system is that it binds 
the authorities to a need to make the balance of payments a constraint on policy. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a country cannot adopt whatever measures it 
thinks necessary to achieve domestic policy objectives, without considering their 
consequences for the balance of payments or without taking into account their 
effects on other economies. Similarly, a country's domestic objectives can be 
upset by the imported effects of deflationary or inflationary policies pursued by its 
trading partners. 
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The current interest in monetary integration in Southern Africa as stated by the 
PTA is motivated by the desire to create an environment for economic cooperation 
that will facilitate intra-regional trade and investment; to reduce the cost of 
exchanging currencies in intra-regional trade; to save on the use of "hard" 
currencies in settling intra-regional trade; and, among other things, to improve 
price stability. 
The ultimate aim is to establish a monetary union that will involve the use of 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates; a single currency or parallel currencies; full 
harmonization of economic, fiscal and monetary policies of member states; full 
convertibility of the currencies of member states; full integration of the financial 
structures of member states; pooling of foreign reserves; and the establishment of 
a common monetary authority. The question may be asked whether Southern 
African nations satisfy the conditions for a monetary union. 
The level of factor mobility in the sub-region is fairly high. For example, there 
are believed to be 400,000 to 450,000 migrant workers from SADC member states 
working in South Africa. In addition, there are about 200,000 semi-permanent 
migrants there. Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique receive significant sums 
from migrant workers (SATUCC, 1991). There are several South African 
nationals working or doing business in SADC member states. Many citizens of 
SADC live and work in SADC countries other than their own. Labour migration 
promotes efficient allocation of manpower resources and should, under competitive 
conditions, help to reduce inequality in labour earnings among different countries. 
However, almost all countries in the sub-region have placed some restrictions on 
the free movement of labour to safeguard employment for their nationals. Future 
economic cooperation may assist in reducing these restrictions. But the speed with 
which this will be done will depend on how rapidly the various countries can solve 
their unemployment problems. The seriousness of the problem can be gauged 
from the fact that in South Africa alone, between 40 and 50 per cent of the potential 
workforce is estimated to be without formal employment (COSATU, 1991). 
With respect to capital flows, there is strong South African investment presence 
in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. South Africa has also been involved in 
electricity generation in Mozambique and, more recently in water development in 
Lesotho. Both to protect these investments and to the advantage of other 
investment opportunities in the SADC sub-region, it is in the best interest of South 
Africa to forge closer economic cooperation with other Southern African countries. 
There is mutual interdependence with respect to transport as well. Six of the 
SADC member states are landlocked and in varying degrees use the South African 
transport system which is an important alternative. For some the natural and most 
economic routes are through South Africa. Eighty per cent of SADC traffic passed 
through South Africa in 1980. The proportion of SADC traffic passing through 
that country is now down to 30 per cent, but still significant. For Northern 
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Transvaal, the Limpopo Corridor represents the shortest route to the sea. It is 
therefore a matter of economic logic and common sense that S ADC member states 
should promote monetary integration with post-Apartheid South Africa. 
For those countries that are members of SADC, their total intra-SADC trade as 
a proportion of their total trade is small (Table 1). Moreover, the share of intra-
SADC trade in total trade has not increased since the formation of S ADCC in 1980. 
In fact it may have even declined (SADCC, 1988). However, once South Africa 
is brought on to the scene, the picture changes completely, showing a relatively 
higher degree of trade interdependence. 
For the SADC sub-region and individual member states of SADC, South Africa 
is the single largest trading partner in Africa, reflecting complementarity of their 
economies, geographical closeness and common historical ties. Between 1983 
and 1986 for example, SADC exports to South Africa amounted to just over US 
$ 1 billion and her imports from South Africa totalled US $5.5 billion. SADC trade 
with South Africa thus amounted to over US $6.5 billion. This was more than three 
times the amount of intra-SADC trade which amounted to only US $2 billion 
between 1983 and 1986 (SADC, 1988). For the SADC member states, imports 
from South Africa represent 30 per cent of total imports, while exports to South 
Africa are 7 per cent of their total exports. And, for South Africa, the SADC sub-
region is an important market that absorbs 10 per cent of its exports, more than it 
sends to the EEC. In these circumstances, further monetary integration would have 
an immediate impact on the economies of the Southern African sub-region. 
The share of intra-regional trade (once South Africa is included) in the total 
foreign trade of individual member countries is shown in Table 2. The export share 
for Lesotho is extremely high, as is the import share of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. The export and import shares of Malawi and Zimbabwe are significant, 
as are the import shares of Mozambique and Zambia. Only Tanzania and Angola 
have low intra-regional export and import shares. 
Table 1 Intra-SADC trade 1981/86 
Year SDR Mlns Share in total trade 
1981 548 4.7% 
1982 536 4,7% 
1983 495 4.5% 
1984 • 512 4.5% 
1985 417 3.8% 
1986 384 4.2% 
Source: SADCC Regional Economic Survey, 1988. 
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In terms of diversification of national economies, some countries are heavily 
dependent on a single sector (Table 3). These are Botswana (mining), Mozambique 
(agriculture) and Tanzania (agriculture). Moderately dependent on a single sector 
are South Africa (mining), Zambia (mining) and Angola (agriculture). Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe have well diversified economies. 
Table 2 Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade (%) 
1983 
Exports 
1986 1983/86 1983 
Imports 
1980 1983/86 
Angola - - - _ 
Botswana - - 0.7 - - 70.0 
Lesotho - - 90.0 - - 95.0 
Malawi 20.5 17.5 17.6 49.5 36.0 45.2 
Mozambique 11.5 2.0 - 15.7 18.1 15.7 
Swaziland - - - - - 80.0 
Tanzania 1.0 0.5 - 5.1 1.5 -
Zambia 2.11 - 5.12 21.0' - 25.12 
Zimbabwe 32.43 23.3 23.3 35.33 27.6 28.1 
South Africa - - - - - -
11980 
21983/85 
31981. 
Source: SADCC Regional Economic Survey, 1988. 
Table 3 Southern African countries : Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (%) 
Agriculture Industry1 Manufacturing Services 
Angola 462 232 32 312 
Botswana 3 57 6 40 
Lesotho 24 30 14 46 
Malawi 33 20 14 46 
Mozambique 65 15 - 21 
Namibia 11 38 5 50 
Swaziland 242 302 202 462 
Tanzania 59 12 10 29 
Zambia 17 55 43 29 
Zimbabwe , 13 40 26 47 
South Africa 5 44 26 51 
includes manufacturing, construction, mining and utilities. 
21987 
Source: World Bank Development Report 1992 and Sub-Saharan Africa 
from Crisis to Sustainable Growth. 
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The export trade of Southern Africa is less well diversified. Angola, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are highly dependent on the export of one 
group of primary commodities. Lesotho is also dependent on the export of primary 
commodities. Only Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa have diversified 
export bases (Table 4). The implication of this is that most of the countries in the 
region need a flexible exchange rate vis a vis non-regional trading partners to deal 
with fluctuations in primary commodity prices. 
With the exception of South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland, all the countries 
in the region are undertaking structural adjustment programmes. Among other 
things, these programmes aim at removing controls on prices and wages and hence 
to increase the role of the market in price and wage determination. This is helping 
to improve the flexibility of prices and wages. In the countries that are not 
undertaking structural adjustment programmes, market forces are already given 
prominence in the determination of prices and wages. 
As regards nominal and real convergence, as measured by the range of inflation 
rates and the standard deviation, the dispersion of inflation rates in Southern Africa 
has increased since 1978 (Table 5). So has the dispersion of per capita GNPs 
(Table 6). The task of converging these variables has, accordingly, increased. 
Although the extent of economic integration between South Africa and other 
Southern African economies is high, the relationship between them is essentially 
one between core and periphery. Some indication of dominance can be found in 
Table 7. In terms of land mass, the size of South Africa is exceeded slightly only 
Table 4 Southern Africa : Structure of merchandise exports (% of total) 
Fuels Other Machinery Other Textiles 
minerals primary and manufac- and 
and commo- transport tures clothing 
metals dities equipment 
Angola 82 5 12 
Botswana 20 17 3 61 
Lesotho 0 64 0 36 
Malawi 0 95 0 5 3 
Mozambique1 14 84 0 2 1 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 5 84 1 10 3 
Zambia2 93 4 1 2 
Zimbabwe2 17 43 3 37 
South Africa 14 12 3 71 1 
'1965 
21987 
Source; World Development Report, 1992. 
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by Angola. The large land mass gives it a diversified natural resource base. Its 
population of 35.9 million in 1990 exceeded that of every other Southern African 
economy and constituted about 30.4 per cent of the total population of the region. 
South Africa's GNP per capita of US $2,530 exceeded that of Botswana the richest 
country in the SADC by US $490 and that of Mozambique, the poorest, by a factor 
of over 30. South Africa's GDP, exports, imports and the money supply (Ml) also 
exceed those of the best performers in the SADC by large factors. 
The theory of monetary integration suggests that a currency union will impose 
macroeconomic discipline on its members. The principle of one price, for 
example, should lead to convergence of price levels, at least for tradeable goods. 
Similarly, arbitrage should ensure convergence of interest rates. Empirical 
evidence suggests, however, that where you have in a currency union a dominant 
or core member and small members in the periphery, in the long run consumer 
Table 5 Southern Africa : Maximum, minimum and mean rates of inflation (%) 
Maximum Minimum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1978 16.4 5.7 9.8 3.4 
1979 18.1 9.7 11.8 3.4 
1980 30.3 5.4 16.4 7.1 
1981 25.6 9.6 16.4 4.8 
1982 28.9 9.4 14.4 5.9 
1983 27.1 10.3 17.3 5.4 
1984 36.2 6.7 17.0 8.5 
1985 33.3 9.0 17.3 7.3 
1986 60.0 10.3 20.6 15.3 
1987 55.0 8.1 19.9 14.3 
1988 55.5 7.4 20.9 14.6 
1989 96.4 9.4 23.7 26.1 
1990 75.0 11.4 22.0 20.5 
Source: Statistical Offices of Member Countries. 
Table 6 Southern Africa: : Maximum, minimum and mean per capita GNP (US $) 
1980 1989 1990 
Maximum 
! 
2,300 2,470 2,530 
Minimum 230 80 80 
Mean 640 774 818 
Standard Deviation 643 686 752 
Source: World Development Reports. 
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price inflation is largely determined in the core. Uncontrolled interest rates also 
converge to core country levels (Honohan, 1992). 
Another aspect of the desirable extent of the currency area in Southern Africa 
is w hether it should encompass SADC or extend to the whole of the PTA. As stated 
at ihe beginning, both SADC and PTA intend to pursue monetary harmonization 
programmes with a view ultimately to establishing a single currency. As they 
proceed, duplication of effort and even conflict will arise as all members of SADC 
(except Botswana) are also members of the PTA. 
1 n order to avoid duplication and potential conflict, the 1991 Summit of the PTA 
proposed a merger between the two organisations. The proposed merger has not 
taken place. Instead, SADC and PTA will continue to exist as autonomous 
organisations following the decision of the Summit of SADC taken on 17th 
August, 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia, to reject the proposal of the Authority of the 
PTA that the two organisations should merge into a Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). The reason given for taking this decision is that 
SADC and PTA have distinct objectives and mandates. 
With emphasis on tariff reduction, the development of appropriate monetary 
institutions and instruments and on monetary harmonization, the activities of the 
PTA have in the past been seen as largely complementing those of the SADC. As 
SADC proceeds to integrate the economies of its members through similar 
programmes, duplication of efforts which in the past was confined to the 
development of the real sectors of the economy, will no doubt increase. 
Table 7 The relative sizes of Southern African economies 
Population Area GNP Per GDP Merchandise Merchandise Money 
(Millions) ('000s Capita (Millions Exports Imports (Millions 
Mid-1990 of in US$ US$ (Millions (Millions US$ 
Sq. 1990 1990) US$ US$ 1990) 
km) 1990) 1990) 
Angola 10.0 1,247 610 7,700 3,000 1,200 313 
Botswana 1.3 582 2,040 2,700 1,753 1,606 103 
Lesotho 1.8 30 530 340 59 621 182 
Malawi 8.5 118 200 1,600 412 576 n.a. 
Mozambique 15.7 802 80 1320 127 796 n.a. 
Namibia 1.8 824 824 n.a. n.a. n.a. 77 
Swaziland 0.8 17 810 n.a. 557 632 -
Tanzania 24.5 945 110 2,060 300 935 -
Zambia 8.1 753 420 3,120 2,138 977 294 
Zimbabwe 9.8 391 640 5,310 1,633 1,851 917 
South Africa 35.9 1,221 2,530 90,720 26,612 18,258 19,457 
Source: World Development Report 1992 and African Development Indicators. 
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On the way towards establishing an economic community, SADC may put in 
place a free trade area, or a customs union or a common market. The formation 
of any one of these three modes of economic integration would subject SADC 
members who are also members of the PTA to two trade regimes which would 
complicate commercial relations. Among other things, they would have to decide 
which regime to apply vis a vis each other if, say, both SADC and PTA were 
preferential trade areas or free trade areas. The Summit of SADC is aware of the 
potential conflict arising from duplication in the activities of the two organisations. 
Towards avoiding duplication, it is looking for ways and means by which relations 
between SADC and PTA can best be harmonized. 
Should the PTA make progress on its programme of monetary harmonization, 
the SADC may wish to work closely with the PTA to ensure convertibility of the 
currency of the SADC member state that is not a member of the PTA and ultimately 
to establish a common currency. If the PTA fails to make progress, SADC will go 
ahead with its own plan to establish a system of convertible national currencies 
and, ultimately, to establish a common currency for its constituency. 
IV Alternative models of monetary 
integration 
Introduction 
From what has been discussed previously, it is clear that monetary union comprises 
the following elements: 
(i) use of a common currency or, if there are several currencies, existence of a 
permanently and rigidly fixed exchange rate relationship between the 
currencies of the area; 
(ii) a common monetary and fiscal policy to ensure collective control over the 
rate of creation of high powered money and the expansion of government 
debt; 
(iii) a union management of the common pool of foreign exchange reserves, 
external debt and exchange rate policy; 
(iv) harmonization of domestic credit achieved by the imposition of maximum 
credit ceilings. The allocation and distribution of domestic credit between 
sectors are retained by the national monetary authorities; 
(v) existence of a regional monetary authority or central bank in the case of a 
common currency which is the sole issuer of the common currency; and 
(vi) a common development bank to finance regional and national projects to 
assist in the integration process and reduce economic disparities between the 
union member countries. 
There are many forms of monetary integration which, in a sense, are a 
continuum of options or stages, beginning with a very loose association that 
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permits a great degree of independent national action in economic and monetary 
policy formulation to the most restraining or full monetary union. In increasing 
order of economic sophistication, these options are: limited currency convertibility; 
the European Monetary Union Model; the parallel union currency model; the 
single common currency model; and the complete monetary and economic union 
- the U.S.A. model. 
The following sketch gives a brief description of each of these forms of 
monetary integration, their suitability for the Southern Africa region, the stages 
involved in reaching the ultimate stages, and potential costs and benefits of each 
form of monetary integration. 
Limited currency convertibility 
Where the creation of a single currency is considered to be a drastic step, countries 
may decide to do no more than create convertibility at market clearing or fixed 
exchange rates among their separate national currencies. Referred to as limited 
currency convertibility, this is not as ideal as a single currency system. But, it docs 
permit unrestricted exchange and use of the currencies of the countries within the 
sub-region. In other words, all exchange restrictions vis a vis the currencies of the 
sub-region are eliminated. Limited currency convertibility is an important step 
towards a monetary union for a group of countries that agree to harmonise or unify 
their exchange rate policies and adopt a policy of uniform variation of their 
exchange rates with the rest of the world. 
An UNCTAD study which was undertaken for the ECOWAS group of 
countries defined limited currency convertibility in a narrower sense as "... a set 
of co-ordinated national exchange arrangements undertaken by those regional 
member countries imposing payments restrictions on their current transactions 
with other countries which would provide for a programme of faster liberalisation 
for intra-regional payments than for payments in respect of the rest of the world" 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1983). The narrowness of this definition is rooted in a 
gradualist philosophy of moving toward a monetary union on a step-by-step basis. 
However, this approach fails to provide any firm commitment on the part of 
member countries to maintain fixed exchange rates between their currencies and 
leaves virtually untouched the wide latitude to carry out independent and divergent 
monetary and economic policies that can militate against efforts to achieve greater 
monetary and economic integration in a region. 
Instead of adopting a decision to create a monetary union immediately, the PTA 
decided in 1991 to first work towards limited currency convertibility to be 
achieved between 1997 and 2000. An informal exchange rate union will also be 
established during this time. Under the proposed union, the exchange rates of 
regional currencies will be fixed to each other and vary in unison against third 
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currencies. This will be done by pegging to the ECU or the UAPTA. However, 
there will be no coordination of macroeconomic policies or a common central 
bank. 
In reaching this decision, consideration was given to the difficulties that 
member states would face in reducing large budget deficits and hence huge 
domestic bank borrowing requirements, and in adjusting misaligned exchange 
rates within a reasonable time period to create conditions for full monetary 
integration. Reduction in budget deficits is subject to a number of uncertainties in 
the region. In addition, as a number of countries were still undertaking structural 
adjustment programmes, it was felt that it was best to complete their economic 
adjustment first. Lastly, among other things, central banks were not keen to lose 
their independence in policy making immediately. 
Before the proposed PTA scheme to introduce limited currency convertibility 
is implemented, member countries will, wherever necessary, be expected to 
reduce budget deficits and hence government bank borrowing requirements and 
to adjust exchange rates to their market levels. 
Malawi's fiscal deficit is relatively low and so are government borrowing 
requirements from the banking system. As such, no major adjustments in these 
variables are required (PTA, 1990). In fact, it has been simulated that to sustain 
recent rates of economic growth, the country could do with a higher rate of central 
bank credit expansion to government, assuming an inflation rate of 10 per cent per 
annum. If the target rate of inflation were lower, there might be need to reduce the 
budget deficit and bank credit to the government. 
The main cost to Malawi would be associated with exchange rate adjustment. 
The country's currency is overvalued. In 1990 a devaluation of 43 per cent was 
necessary to correct overvaluation (PTA, 1990). The currency has since been 
devalued by more than 50 per cent, but the degree of overvaluation is still high. 
Inevitably, further devaluations will exacerbate inflation. 
The other cost would be the loss of autonomy over the exchange rate. Malawi 
would not be able to use the exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment since it 
would (a) be fixed in relation to other regional currencies and (b) vary in unison 
with other regional currencies vis a vis third currencies. Otherwise, there would 
be no transfer of autonomy in several areas of monetary and fiscal policy to a 
central authority or loss of freedom to issue currency. Other potential benefits 
might accrue to the economy from reducing the rate of inflation to an acceptable 
level, and from reducing illegal foreign exchange markets and currency smuggling. 
The European Monetary System (EMS) Model 
The EMS is an arrangement by the participating European countries to ensure 
closer financial cooperation and create a zone of monetary stability in the 
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European Community. The system essentially involves the harmonisation of 
exchange rates through co-operative intervention in their foreign exchange 
markets to eliminate or minimize exchange risks in their trade and other economic-
relations. Its long-term goal is economic and monetary unity in which a single 
currency replaces the existing national currencies. The foundation of the EMS is 
said to be deeply anchored in the shared desire of all the common market countries 
to seek growth and better resource allocation through greater exchange rate 
stability. 
The EMS replaced the earlier system set up for narrowing the margins of 
fluctuation between EEC countries popularly referred to as the "Snake". The new 
system includes some of the operational and institutional elements of the "Snake". 
There are also new features such as the European Currency Unit (ECU). The ECU 
is a composite monetary unit based on a basket of the community's currencies and 
is identical to the former European Unit of Account (EAU). But, unlike the EAU, 
there is provision spelling out the procedure for its periodic revision. As a hub 
around which the system revolves, it serves as a numeraire for fixing central rates; 
a reference unit for the operation of the divergent indicator; a denominator for 
operations in the intervention and credit mechanisms; and as a means of settlemeni 
between monetary authorities of the EEC. The three mechanisms on which the 
EMS is based are the exchange rate and intervention mechanism, the accounting 
and settlement mechanism and the credit mechanism. 
The exchange rate and intervention mechanism provides for unlimited 
compulsory intervention on the exchanges of bilateral limits of fluctuation 
between participating currencies and the divergence indicator which helps to 
determine when action should be taken by the authorities responsible for the 
currency whose rate exceeds certain limits which are fixed in terms of the ECU. 
All the EEC currencies have an ECU-related central rate, with the exception of the 
pound sterling. By linking together the ECU-related central rates, the bilateral 
central rate for each of the currencies participating in the EMS is obtained. The 
bilateral intervention limits are calculated by applying to each of the bilateral 
central rates the maximum margin of fluctuation of plus or minus 2.25% (6% of 
the Lira). The participating countries are obliged to keep the rates of their 
currencies within these bilateral limits. The solidarity of the community is ensured 
by a modest and limited attempt to pool their reserves, expand existing credit 
mechanisms and provide measures designed to strengthen the economies of the 
less prosperous member states of the community. 
The credit mechanisms which are in three parts consists of: 
(i) the very short-term financing (45-90 days) provided by the participating 
central banks, used for the purposes of intervention in the foreign exchange 
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markets of the member states; 
(ii) the short-term monetary support (also provided by the central banks) to 
finance needs arising from temporary balance of payments deficits and 
granted for a period of 3-9 months; 
(iii) the medium-term financial assistance (2-5 years) granted by the European 
Council to any member facing external payments problems and subject to 
agreement on the part of the borrowing country to adhere to certain 
economic and monetary conditions. 
The measures aimed at strengthening the economies of the weaker members of the 
community include the granting of interest rate subsidies for loans to such 
countries by community institutions including the European Investment Bank. 
Such loans are used mainly to finance infrastructural projects or programmes. 
There is also the provision for the progressive establishment at a future date of 
specific long-term aid in favour of countries which have structural or developmental 
problems in some of their regions. Such aid is given at present through community 
guarantee for privately or publicly issued stocks by member countries facing long-
term structural problems. 
In general, the EMS may be described as a loosely integrated monetary zone 
characterised by a close alignment of the participating members' exchange rates; 
some harmonization of monetary policy through co-operative intervention in their 
exchanges; some cooperation in fiscal policy but the retention of substantial 
national autonomy in most major areas of economic and financial policies. 
The proposed PTA unification of exchange rates set for 2000-2024 will entail 
the harmonization of exchange rates along the lines of the EMS to ensure closer 
financial cooperation and create a zone of monetary stability. Exactly how the 
PTA arrangement will work is not known. But it is likely to involve close 
alignment of the members' exchange rates, some harmonization of monetary 
policy through co-operative intervention in the exchange markets, coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy through a common monetary institution and the pooling 
of foreign exchange reserves. 
The implementation of the scheme will require the use of sophisticated 
mechanisms to maintain stability in exchange rates which will have to be learnt. 
Furthermore, foreign exchange markets will have to be developed. Whether the 
national banks will have the resources to offer credit facilities to fund balance of 
payments deficits is another matter. Although the PTA has a development bank, 
its resource base will have to be increased substantially to adequately finance the 
development of least developed member states. Given the low degree of economic 
integration in the PTA region, the desirability of an EMS-type arrangement is on 
the whole questionable. 
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Under this arrangement, which will be put in place between 2000 and 2024 in 
the PTA, the potential benefits accruing to Malawi enumerated above are expected 
to be greater because of the formation of a formal exchange rate union involving 
full convertibility of currencies, immutably fixed exchange, the formation of a 
common monetary authority and coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. In 
addition, Malawi may benefit from the credit mechanisms for financing external 
deficits, from development finance, from improved efficiency of domestic monetary 
management, and from increased external capital inflows. 
Although the national central bank will be retained with the power to issue the 
national currency, there will be loss of autonomy in major areas of monetary 
policy, loss of the exchange rate as an internal policy of adjustment, and loss of 
other monetary and fiscal policies to control inflation. 
Parallel Union Currency Model 
A "parallel currency" arrangement is a system whereby a common union currency 
is issued to circulate side by side with national currencies to which it has a defined 
and fixed relationship. 
The concept of a parallel currency was first mooted in Europe in the early 
1970's as an intermediate stage through which the European Community could 
progress towards the ultimate goal of achieving a monetary union. In one 
proposal, it was suggested that a common currency to be called "Europa" should 
be issued to circulate side by side with the national currencies of the community 
whose exchange rates against the Europa should be given a defined and fixed 
relationship. As indicated earlier, an important condition for the proper functioning 
of a monetary union is that the currencies function as a single currency whether 
or not separate currencies are retained. The attraction of this model, therefore, is 
that it offers a workable solution for a region which wants a monetary union but 
manifests a symbolic or sentimental attachment to its national currencies. For the 
system to work there must be an irrevocable commitment to a permanently fixed 
exchange rate and full and costless convertibility. The proponents of this model 
argue that it will help to avoid the problem of premature substitution of a union 
currency for the national currencies which could cause widespread confusion, 
suspicion and disruption of existing monetary systems. 
Under this model, the parallel union currency can be used as the reference 
numeraife for the national currencies and circulate with them. It should be freely 
interchangeable with the national currencies at fixed rates between it and the other 
national currencies. A major element of the system is the establishment of a union 
monetary authority with powers to issue the parallel as well as the national 
currencies. This will guarantee the needed elasticity in the supply of each national 
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currency in exchange for any of the other national currencies. As in the single 
currency model, it must be stressed that an essential element for the success of the 
system is that there must be true and convincing commitment to a monetary union 
by the governments of the member states. 
In this system national central banks are retained but their existing autonomy 
in monetary and credit management is reduced in favour of the union monetary 
authority which is jointly exercised by the member states. 
The parallel union currency model is certainly a more advanced stage than the 
ones that have been considered so far. It is a model that was adopted by the Rand 
Monetary Area after the attainment of political independence by Botswana (which 
left the area in 1975), Lesotho and Swaziland. The Rand Monetary Agreement of 
1974, which brought it about, paved the way for the setting up of national central 
banks in Lesotho and Swaziland and for the issue of separate national currencies. 
Under the agreement, South Africa compensates Swaziland and Lesotho for 
allowing its currency to circulate in those countries. The reverse does not apply 
- the Lesotho Loti and the Swaziland Lilangeni do not circulate in South Africa. 
The exchange rate between the three currencies is fixed at unity. 
The retention of national central banks and a national currency under this model 
appeals to member states. However, autonomy in monetary and credit management 
is reduced in favour of a union monetary authority exercised jointly by member 
states. Where, as in the Common Monetary Area, one member state is a dominant 
partner, not only may the union policies be largely influenced by it, but also 
economic developments in this country may have a large impact on the economic 
stability of the other member countries. 
This model will probably appeal to SADC because of the association with it of 
three of its current member states (Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the past 
association with it by Botswana, and the potential membership of South Africa in 
the SADC. SADC would like South Africa to join it on terms of equality with other 
member states. Adopting the rand as the union currency would not be consistent 
with that aim. In any case, the South African economy has been quite unstable for 
a long time and the rate of inflation has been high. These problems are likely to 
continue and could impact adversely on the stability of the partner economies. For 
this reason, the adoption of an independent currency as the union currency for the 
SADC region would be more acceptable. 
Single Common Currency Model 
Suppose that This model involves an arrangement by which a number of countries 
are grouped in a monetary area with a single currency and a common monetary 
authority, which performs the following primary functions: 
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(i) the issuance of the common currency; 
(ii) the holding and management of the external assets of the member countries 
in a common pool; and 
(iii) the management of the monetary and some aspects of the fiscal policies of 
the member countries, so as to facilitate monetary stability and the full and 
unlimited convertibility of their currency against the external reference 
currency to which it is immutably pegged. 
A major element in the successful functioning of the system is provided by the 
link with an external convertible currency and the support of the issuing government 
which guarantees the unlimited convertibility of the union currency. 
This is the model that, after adopting the parallel union currency model, SADC 
may wish to work towards. The PTA has decided to adopt a single currency in 
2025. The loss of national sovereignty may be outweighed by the benefits of the 
monetary union. Finding the support of a government that is willing to have the 
union currency linked to its currency and to guarantee the unlimited convertibility 
of the union currency may pose a problem. 
An attempt has been made to quantify the potential costs and benefits that 
would accrue to Malawi under a single common currency model or a parallel union 
currency. 
Transaction Cost Savings 
There would be savings of foreign exchange transaction costs under a monetary 
harmonization phase where the volume of buying and selling of foreign exchange 
by transactors has been reduced as under a Parallel Union Currency Model, and 
more so where foreign exchange buying and selling has been eliminated completely 
as under a Single Common Currency Model. In turn this would be conducive to 
the growth of inter-regional trade among co-operating countries. 
For Malawi savings on transaction costs are illustrated in Table 8 through the 
foreign exchange profits (gross revenue from exchange and commission) made by 
the only two commercial banks operating in the country. In 1989 commercial 
banks' foreign exchange profits totalled K27.8 million and rose to K38.2 million 
in 1990 and K46.2 million in 1991. Their profit from Malawi's transactions with 
SADC, plus South Africa as a potential member, have been estimated using the 
percentage share of Malawi's merchandise trade (imports plus exports) with 
SADC and South Africa in Malawi's global trade, which in 1989 was 35.3%; this 
proportion is assumed not to have changed in 1990 and 1991 on which direction 
of trade data is not yet available. Using this proportion, commercial banks' profits 
from Malawi's transactions with SADC and South Africa are estimated at K9.8 
MONETARY HARMONIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 2 5 
million in 1989, rising to K13.4 million in 1990 and K16.3 million in 1991 (Table 
8). 
The K9.8 million estimated foreign exchange transaction cost for 1989 relating 
to SADC and South Africa was 1.3 per cent of Malawi's trade with this region, a 
proportion which also applied to the country's global trade. This and the other 
foregoing estimates require some qualifications. Firstly, the foreign trade data 
used includes transactions by the government, essentially imports, which are not 
handled through commercial banks; they are, however, a smaller proportion of the 
country's total imports. Secondly, commercial banks' profits from foreign 
exchange trading include dealings relating to services other than freight and 
insurance of imports and exports. 
It is unambiguous that the saving in transaction costs involving foreign 
exchange would tend to induce Malawi's importers and exporters to increase 
the volume of trade with Southern African countries. Within the country, 
however, the net effect of such saving is ambiguous. While importers and 
exporters would benefit, banks would lose the profit and consequently the 
government would also lose some income tax revenue. 
Savings in Foreign Exchange 
Savings in foreign exchange would take place partially under a Parallel Union 
Currency arrangement, as is true for imports from South Africa in the case of 
Table 8 Some Transaction Costs of Malawi's Foreign Trade (K'000) 
1989 1990 1991 
Malawi's imports and domestic exports1 
a) All countries 2,128,97 
b) SADC (with South Africa) 752,545 
c) Column (b) as % of (a) 35.3%2 
Commercial banks' profit on foreign exchange dealing:3 
d) All countries 27,774 
e) SADC (with South Africa) 9,804 
35.3%, i.e. column (c) as % of (d) 
f) Column (d) as % of (a), or (e) as % of (b) 1.3% 
11ncludes transactions not handled by commercial banks. 
2Assuming no change in the proportion from the one in 1989. 
includes foreign exchange dealing on services not related to merchandise. The figures are for a 
calendar year. 
Source: Various annual reports and accounts of commercial banks 
35.3%2 35.3%2 
38,174 46,161 
13,475 16,294 
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Swaziland, Namibia and Lesotho, where the rand circulates, and fully under a 
Single Common Currency arrangement. For Malawi, foreign exchange savings 
would assume considerable importance because she is a net importer from the 
SADC region (K47 million in 1987, rising to K122 million in 1989), more so when 
South Africa is added to the grouping (K209 million in 1987, increasing to K565 
million in 1989) as shown in Table 9. In fact Malawi is more of a net importer from 
Southern African region than from the rest of the world (see 'other countries' in 
Table 9) to which she is sometimes a net exporter as was recently the case in 1986 
and 1987, after which she reversed into a net importer in 1988 and 1989. Under 
a Single Common Currency arrangement such former net trade deficit positions 
would be fully paid through the use of the common currency, thereby fully 
representing foreign exchange saving. The savings in foreign exchange received 
from outside the region in the form of export earnings, grants and loans now used 
on purchases from the region would therefore be available for use outside the 
region. However under a Parallel Union Currency arrangement and other partial 
monetary harmonization arrangements, trade deficits would have to be still 
cleared through the use of hard currencies, so that foreign exchange saving would 
also be partial. As monetary harmonization progresses, some trade will tend to be 
diverted from outside to within the region, thereby also leading to some saving of 
foreign exchange; although that may have its own costs. 
Loss of tax revenue 
Under a Single Common Currency Model or any form of monetary cum trade 
cooperation among Southern African countries which would, inter alia, remove 
tariff barriers to foreign trade, Malawi's central government would lose considerably 
in terms of tax revenue from foreign traded goods. This is essentially in the form 
of receipts from duties on imports and surtax which is additionally levied on them; 
there are no export taxes in Malawi. On the basis of the average for the four years 
to 1989,no less than an estimated 41 percent ( rowcofTable 10) of tax on imports 
was on goods originating from the Southern African region including South 
Africa; in 1978 the proportion was 36 per cent or K69 million and rose to 47 per 
cent or K199 million (row b) in 1989. 
As a proportion of revenue on the recurrent account of the central government 
budget, tax revenue on imports from the Southern African region constituted an 
average of 18.4 per cent during the four years to 1989. This would not be a small 
revenue loss arising from regional cooperation that, among other things, removed 
tariffs on intra-regional trade. 
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Loss of use of exchange rate as a policy tool 
Loss of use of the exchange rate as a policy tool would be of considerable concern 
to Malawi when regional monetary cooperation, which entails such loss, is 
established. This is so because Malawi trades with the rest of the world more than 
with the Southern African region, more so for the proportion of exports than 
imports (Table 9). Thus Malawi would lose use of the exchange rate through 
devaluation/depreciation of the Kwacha to sustain or improve performance of a 
much greater proportion of her exports which is shipped outside the Southern 
African region; it averaged 85 per cent from 1986 to 1989. 
Parallel foreign exchange markets 
Although their exact size is not known, parallel foreign exchange markets exist in 
all the countries in the region. The existence and growth of these markets is a 
reaction to formal inconvertibility of the regional currencies reflected in exchange 
control regulations that limit the use of these currencies in international transactions 
and the limited number of dealers through whom foreign currency transactions can 
Table 9 Malawi's Foreign Trade1 (K'000) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
SADC (without South Africa) 
Imports 
Exports 
Net imports (-) 
33,534 
45,402 
+11,868 
65,336 
17,852 
-47,484 
88,019 
26,212 
-61,807 
144,572 
22,921 
-121,651 
SADC (with South Africa) 
Imports 
Exports 
Net imports (-) 
172,186 
78,390 
-93,796 
291,727 
83,390 
-208,556 
425,784 
114,922 
-310,862 
658,945 
93,600 
-565,345 
Other Countries 
Imports 
Exports 
Net exports (-) 
300,786 
370,677 
+64,891 
362,212 
519,317 
+157,105 
654,367 
627,109 
-27,258 
739,858 
636,569 
-103,711 
All Countries 
Iports 
Exports 
Net imports (-) 
477,972 
449,067 
-28,905 
653,939 
602,488 
-51,451 
1,080,151 
742,031 
-338,121 
1,398,804 
730,169 
-668,635 
1 Imports are on a C.I.F. basis. Exports are on F.O.B. basis and exclude re-exports. 
Source: Malawi Government, National Statistical Office, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 1992. 
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be effected, among other things. Foreign exchange transactions in parallel markets 
benefit the participants to the extent that they can obtain foreign currency more 
easily and more conveniently without restriction and without having to fill forms 
and wait. For this service, however, they pay a high premium above the official 
exchange rate. As shown in Table 10, the premium is usually high in the presence 
of an overvalued exchange rate. To narrow or eliminate this premium, it is 
important to pay particular attention to fiscal and monetary policy because direct 
devaluation merely to bring the official rate to the parallel rate does not always 
achieve this if fiscal and monetary imbalances persist in an economy. 
The establishment of currency convertibility would reduce the need for parallel 
foreign exchange markets, but it would not eliminate it as long as facilities through 
which currencies could be exchanged were limited and as long as prices for goods 
and services were not equal in different member countries. The establishment of 
a single common currency would eliminate the need for parallel exchange markets. 
Complete Monetary and Economic Union (USA) Model 
This is the ultimate or ideal goal of any monetary integration effort. It is 
characterised by the issuance of a single currency for the region, thereby eliminating 
all exchange risks and payments restrictions within the area. It entails the complete 
displacement of all existing autonomous national banks with regional banks in a 
federal reserve type system such as operates in the U.S.A. A common external 
exchange rate and monetary and credit policies replace the multiplicity of national 
policies in the area. The freedom by each member country to create money for the 
purpose of deficit financing are severely constrained by the policies pursued by the 
central monetary authority and hence this aspect of fiscal autonomy is also given 
up. To introduce this model into a community of sovereignty states requires 
political unification. 
Although there is no federal-type government in Southern Africa now, SADC 
will be working towards the establishment of one in the future. The Treaty of 
SADC has set as one of the objectives of the organisation the evolution of common 
political values, systems and institutions. Initially, SADC will set up a regional 
parliament and a regional tribunal (SADC, 1992). 
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Table 10 Malawi Central Government Recurrent Account Revenue (K'000) 
Foreign Trade Tax Revenue1 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
Import duty 117,973 34,894 105,871 143,951 
Surtax 73,478 181,638 211,549 279,189 
a) Total all countries of which: 191,451 216,932 317,420 423,140 
b) SADC and South Africa (i.e. 
column (a) x col. (c)) 68,922 96,752 125,063 199,299 
c) Imports from SADC and South 
Africa as % of total imports 36.0% 44.6% 39.4% 47.1% 
Total Recurrent Account Revenue 
d) 456,560 552,321 696,030 866,629 
e) Column (b) as % of (d) 15.1% 17.5% 18.0% 23.0% 
1 There are no export taxes in Malawi 
Source: Table 8. Reserve Bank of Malawi Financial and Economic Review, No. 4,1991, Statistical 
Annex Table 3.1.3 
Table 11 Ratio of Parallel Market to Official Exchange Rates1 
1984 1986 1988 1990 
Botswana 1.71 1.36 1.14 1.03 
Lesotho 1.03 1.11 1.04 1.04 
Malawi 1.53 1.11 1.22 1.20 
Mozambique 34.16 48.23 n.a. n.a. 
Swaziland 1.03 1.11 1.07 1.04 
Tanzania 3.73 4.92 2.13 1.50 
Zambia 1.26 1.25 3.67 4.00 
Zimbabwe 2.25 1.33 1.74 1.36 
South Africa 1.03 1.11 1.04 1.04 
1 A measure of the premium on the official exchange rate. The premium is high in the presence of 
an overvalued exchange rate. 
Source: World Bank and UNDP African Development Indicators, p. 45. 
V Problems on the road towards monetary 
harmonization 
Monetary reforms 
Every country in Southern Africa has its own currency (Namibia will issue one 
soon). Every country (except those in the CMA) also determines its own exchange 
rate regime. Angola pegs its currency to the US dollar; Botswana, Malawi, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe peg theirs to trade weighted baskets of currencies; 
Mozambique and Zambia determine their exchange rates on the basis of a set of 
indicators. Along with divergencies in economic conditions and policies, differences 
in exchange rate arrangements have resulted in very different nominal exchange 
rates in these countries (Appendix 2, Table 1). 
To make matters worse, according to the PTA (1990), the real effective 
exchange rates of most of the countries have diverged from their equilibrium levels 
for most of the past two and a half decades (Appendix 2, Table 2). Most exchange 
rates have suffered from overvaluation which has introduced a bias against 
exports. Zambia and Tanzania, among the countries for which data is available, 
experienced high degrees of overvaluation and hence suffered most from consequent 
price distortions. Of the countries included in the PTA study, only Lesotho and 
Swaziland escaped from the costs of protracted overvaluation. South Africa and 
Namibia, not included in the PTA study, have also experienced less overvaluation. 
In all the four countries, membership of the Common Monetary Area prevented 
adoption of macroeconomic policies that create instability in the exchange rate. 
Outside of the CMA, only one other country, Zimbabwe, has demonstrated 
reasonable*stability in its nominal exchange rate, according to the PTA (1990) 
study. Except for a brief period during the late 1970's, the nominal exchange rate 
remained close to the real effective rate. 
The problem of divergent nominal exchange rates can be minimised by pegging 
all the regional currencies to the same reference currency, or the SDR or to some 
other trade weighted basket of currencies. Fixing the external value of regional 
currencies in this way will ensure stability in the value of one currency vis a vis 
others. Ideally, currencies should be pegged to the external currency or basket of 
currencies at the same rate. In practice, it may be difficult to agree on a common 
external value. 
Considering the advantages of full monetary harmonization, the PTA decided 
in 1991 to work towards the establishment of a single common currency by the year 
2025. The long lead time will give member states sufficient time to carry out 
necessary economic adjustments. As we understand it, the process of creating one 
currency will entail the establishment of limited currency convertibility followed 
by the establishment of an informal exchange rate union (1997-2000) and the 
formation of a formal exchange rate union (2000-2024) before full monetary 
harmonization in 2025. Each stage will start after the successful completion of the 
preceding stage. Two sets of problems will attend this process. 
The first relates to the degree of exchange rate adjustment that will be required. 
As it has been pointed out above, most of the currencies of the region are 
overvalued. The degree of overvaluation has no doubt declined from the excessive 
levels of the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Under structural adjustment 
programmes, several countries are making exchange rate reforms necessary for 
harmonization. For these countries, the rate of currency devaluation that will be 
required is relatively small (Appendix 2, Table 3). For a few that do not appear to 
show evidence of results of significant exchange rate reforms, the rate of devaluation 
would be high. Lesotho, Swaziland, and perhaps South Africa and Namibia, may 
need to revalue their currencies. 
The second and serious problem relates to the amount of adjustment in the 
growth of central bank credit to government. This is required to prevent excessive 
creation of money which would undermine the value of the common currency by 
fuelling inflation. As shown in Appendix 2, Table 4, there are differences in rates 
of growth of credit to government, reflecting underlying economic structures. All 
rates, except the actual, assume a 10 per cent rate of inflation. Whether a uniform 
rate of credit expansion were adopted or not, it is clear that a cut would be necessary 
in Zambia, Tanzania and Lesotho. A target rate of inflation below 10 per cent 
would require a cut in a larger number of countries. 
In terms of institutional capacity, there should be little difficulty with 
harmonization of monetary policies as the Common Monetary Authority would 
take care of this. Divergent economic conditions may necessitate different 
policies, and this could be potential cause of conflict. With respect to the flow of 
short-term credit to the public and private sectors, the PTA plan envisages 
arrangements similar to the ones in place in West and Central African Monetary 
Unions. For development finance, a new institution will not be set up. Instead, 
reliance will be placed on the PTA Trade and Development Bank. 
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Fiscal reforms 
The Technical Study Group that prepared the PTA report on monetary harmonization 
observed that the average level of permissible unified credit expansion to central 
governments would be of the order of 15-20 per cent of previous year's tax 
revenue. For some countries, such a limitation on credit would be tolerable as 
already their borrowing requirements are manageable. For others, it would lead 
to a sizeable unfunded budget deficit (Appendix 2, Table 5). In this group, there 
will be need to raise revenue or cut down expenditure or to do both over a long 
period which will slow down progress towards monetary harmonization. The 
most expeditious approach would be to seek budgetary aid or expanded financial 
support for structural adjustment programmes. 
Lessons for SADCC 
The above illustrates the problems that would have to be resolved if the PTA were 
to work towards monetary harmonization. The PTA plan is based on the 
assumption that convergence of fiscal and monetary policies and hence inflation 
rates is necessary before full monetary union. This assumption is believed by some 
economists to be neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary integration. The act 
of monetary integration creates the fiscal and monetary discipline that ultimately 
produces nominal convergence. 
The PTA dilemma also reflects the fact that the grouping is not an "optimum 
currency area". Total intra-regional trade in absolute terms has fallen since the 
PTA was created. As a proportion of total trade, it is less than 5 per cent. The gain 
from saving in transaction costs made possible by monetary integration would thus 
be small. A few large exporters to the region, Kenya and Zimbabwe, might make 
significant gains out of it. As presently constituted, the gains to SADC might also 
be small. When South Africa is included in the SADC the picture changes for the 
better. 
VI Conclusions 
The aim of a monetary union in Southern Africa is to create a favourable 
environment of the integration of national economies. Such an environment is 
expected to be created by reducing transaction costs associated with the present use 
of separate national currencies in intra-regional trade and by reducing the 
unfavourable effects of exchange rate uncertainty on intra-regional trade and 
investment. Another reason for creating a monetary union would be to enhance 
the anti-inflationary credibility of member states. 
The literature on the desirable extent of a monetary union suggests that the 
benefits from such a union will be greatest when labour and capital mobility among 
member countries is high; when economies within the monetary union are open 
and there is a high volume of trade between them; co-operating economies have 
a diversified economic and export base, which obviates the need for exchange rate 
flexibility; and, among other things, when nominal wage and price flexibility is 
considerable. Economic cooperation in the SADC since 1980 has not created 
favourable conditions by integrating the economies of member states. The 
proportion of intra-regional trade to external trade has remained relatively low, the 
structure of production and exports has not been diversified, labour and capital has 
not become more mobile, and nominal wage and price flexibility is not considerable. 
All these factors would work against the success of a monetary union. The 
inclusion of South Africa improves the prospects for success of a monetary union 
in the sub-region as it improves several of the criteria put down above. It must be 
stressed, however, that close economic ties between the member states may not be 
enough to ensure sustainable monetary integration. Close political ties among 
member states are also necessary to give monetary integration extra legitimacy and 
the institutional mechanisms for its management. Something along the lines of a 
federal type of political arrangement would serve this purpose. 
At present nominal and real divergences among potential members' economies 
are very large. These divergences could undermine the viability of a monetary 
union because (i) greater integration could lead to more centralised activity 
because of the attractiveness of an already established industrial centre which 
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would accelerate divergence; (ii) it could lead to political pressure on the single 
monetary authority, whose independence could be compromised; and (iii) countries 
with high inflation rates and weak competitive positions may have to incur large 
input losses to restore competitiveness which could offset efficiency gains from a 
single currency. The decision of the PTA to start with currency convertibility does 
not reduce the risks posed by nominal and real divergences. The PTA is focusing 
on nominal divergences which may be easier to reduce. But, given the large budget 
deficits of some member states and the consequent large bank borrowing 
requirements, and given the large divergence in several countries between actual 
and equilibrium exchange rates, it is unlikely that the requisite adjustments will be 
accomplished by 1997 to facilitate the establishment of currency convertibility. 
Under these circumstances, planning for monetary harmonization is premature 
and can easily represent a diversion from more practical issues like reducing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. 
Southern Africa has had experience with two monetary unions - the Southern 
Rhodesia Currency Board (later Central African Currency Board, then the Bank 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and the Common Monetary Area. Both unions had 
their origin in colonial times. The interest of the external (colonial) power kept the 
former union intact. As soon as two of the member countries attained political 
independence, the monetary union broke up so that they could exercise autonomy 
in economic management. With the independence of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland came the end of the free movement of labour and capital between the 
three Central African countries as well as restrictions on trade between them. The 
latter monetary union has survived the political independence of several of its 
members because it satisfies most of the criteria for an optimum currency area. 
The association with the Common Monetary Area by three current members of 
SADC (Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia), the past association with it by Botswana, 
together with the potential membership of South Africa in SADC and the evident 
need for some harmonization of monetary and exchange rate policy as a key pillar 
of an integration programme had led to suggestions that the Common Monetary 
Area should be enlarged and the Rand become a "regional currency". This may 
be a false appeal. Adopting the currency of any single member as a regional 
medium of exchange would not be consistent with the aim of promoting a new 
relationship based on equality among member states. In any case, the South 
African economy has been unstable for some time and the rate of inflation has been 
high. These problems may intensify in future as a new democratic government 
steps up public spending to redress domestic social imbalances and could impact 
adversely on the stability of other member states. For these reasons, working 
towards the creation of an independent currency for the SADC region would be 
more acceptable. 
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With specific reference to Malawi, participation in a Southern African Monetary 
Union will bring benefits to the economy, but it will also give rise to costs. It is 
difficult to ascertain potential net benefits because not all benefits and costs are 
readily quantifiable. For example, it is not easy to quantify the benefits from price 
stability or the costs to the economy due to loss of the exchange rate as a policy tool. 
Among the benefits that can be estimated are savings in foreign exchange 
transactions costs and savings in foreign exchange itself by having to use a regional 
currency to effect transactions with regional partners. Under a single common 
currency arrangement, the estimated sum of these two for 1989 amount to K574.8 
million. The loss in tax revenue from elimination of tariffs on intra-regional trade 
for the same year has been estimated at K199.0 million. The difference between 
the two, K375.8 million, represents the estimated net benefit. On the basis of this 
estimate, it is beneficial to Malawi to participate in monetary union and economic 
integration involving the elimination of tariffs. 
Appendix 1. Monetary Unions in Southern 
Africa 
Southern Rhodesia Currency Board served not only that country (now Zimbabwe) 
but also Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) from 
1938 to 1954. This followed monetary agreements between governments of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with that of Southern Rhodesia. The Currency 
Board was introduced under the Southern Rhodesia law in 1938 to consolidate the 
position of currency in circulation which comprised a variety of notes and coin that 
had been introduced in Central Africa by a variety of interested parties, namely 
traders, travellers, missionaries, settlers and expatriate commercial banks (Barclays 
and Standard). The Pound Sterling was their main currency in the early colonial 
period of these countries. 
There were two original objectives of the currency board system. First, to 
devise a method whereby the governments concerned would benefit from the 
profits arising out of the issue of notes and coin for circulation in their territories. 
Second, to ensure the speedy and certain convertibility of local currency into 
sterling at a fixed rate of exchange. 
The Southern Rhodesia Pound, which the Southern Rhodesia Currency Board 
issued, was legal tender for and circulated in all the three countries that the Board 
served. The currency was 100 per cent backed by sterling, paid into a Currency 
Fund which was kept in London as follows: i) partly in liquid form; ii) partly in 
United Kingdom Government securities; iii) securities guaranteed by the UK 
Government; and iv) gold and trustee investment securities within the UK Trustee 
Act. Securities registered locally in the member countries were excluded. An 
amendment in 1947 removed this limitation and permitted that a sum not 
exceeding 20 per cent of the Currency Fund could be invested in local registered 
stocks issued, and if so wished, by the governments of Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were allocated respective maxima of 10 
per cent, 7 per cent and 3 per cent. However, no investment in such stocks (which 
in fact were issued only by Southern Rhodesia) took place during the life of the 
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Currency Board, it seems because of the preference by all the three governments 
for the 100 per cent backing of the currency by sterling; the latter was earned from 
exports. 
As to the achievement of the two original objectives of the currency board 
system, the first one was hardly achieved in that, for a number of reasons, little 
surplus income was earned by the Currency Board for distribution to the three 
member governments; distribution was in proportion to the value of the currency 
circulating in each country. The second objective was achieved, i.e. ensuring 
'speedy and certain' convertibility of the local currency into sterling at a fixed 
exchange rate. However, the wisdom of achieving that through as much as 100 per 
cent currency backing has been questioned by many in the sense that it is 
inconceivable that all the currency in circulation could have been presented for 
conversion into sterling or other strong currency at the same time. Thus a good part 
of the sterling held in the currency fund could have been better used for economic 
development in the three participating poor countries through importing the 
required goods and services or for financing balance of payments deficits. 
The external value of the currency was defined by the Southern Rhodesia law 
in terms of sterling, so that it could only be changed through Parliament of that 
country. Thus the Southern Rhodesia Currency Board had no direct control over 
the currency's external value, and the Board's freedom of action was also 
constrained by the fact that the same Southern Rhodesia Pound was circulating in 
the other two countries as well; it had no means of controlling the monetary system. 
In March 1954 the Southern Rhodesia Currency Board assumed a federal 
character following the birth of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in late 
1953, also referred to as the Central African Federation. Its name was appropriately 
changed to the Central African Currency Board, so too was its composition to 
reflect the broadened political character. The re-named Board was an interim 
measure pending the establishment of a Federal Central Bank, before which the 
Southern Rhodesia Pound was to continue as legal tender in all the three territories. 
The Board's surplus income was now spent on the process of setting up a central 
bank and no longer distributed to the member governments. Its Currency Board 
was no longer allowed to invest in local registered securities of the member 
governments; this deprived the Currency Board of its potential of financing 
development in member territories through local financial instruments, in addition 
to its being allowed to continue to hold member governments' securities issued in 
Sterling in London - in practice it held some sterling securities of the Southern 
Rhodesia Government only. 
On 1 st April 1956, the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland acquired the assets and 
liabilities of the Central African Currency Board and started to operate, with no 
detailed objectives written in its Act of 1956 other than being assigned the 
3 8 RESEARCH PAPER 3 0 
responsibility 'for regulation of the monetary system of the Federation'. The 
central bank became the sole issuer of currency, i.e. the Federal Pound, in the three 
countries; the Southern Rhodesia currency also continued to circulate in the 
Federation for some years. 
Although the external value of the currency was no longer legally defined, in 
practice it was also defined in terms of the Pound Sterling, and on a one to one ratio. 
The Act required the bank to maintain foreign exchange reserves in Sterling, gold 
and other foreign assets convertible into sterling or gold, with all of these adding 
up to a minimum requirement of 25 per cent of its liabilities to the public, a ratio 
which was well exceeded during the bank's life. Apart from small proportions kept 
as balances with the US Federal Reserve System and the Reserve Bank of South 
Africa as well as gold, the rest of the foreign reserves were kept in Sterling. 
Although the bank was legally empowered to deal in various foreign currencies, 
it mainly dealt in Sterling through London, through which commercial banks had 
therefore to acquire other foreign currencies needed by their customers. It can be 
argued that this arrangement delayed personnel of the central bank (later to be split 
into three independent central banks following the dissolution of the Federation) 
in broadening their contacts and knowledge that could have resulted from dealing 
significantly in other foreign currencies as well. 
The considerable weight given to the independence of central banks before the 
second world war was reduced in the post-war period particularly in the 
Commonwealth countries. Before the Second World War maintenance of fixed 
and stable exchange rates of currencies was a major goal of economic/monetary 
policy, which was essentially a function of central banks. After the war, economic 
conditions within a country were given more and more prominence than reacting 
to external conditions, and the role of governments in their domestic economies 
grew, public debt also grew, thereby calling for greater collaboration between a 
central bank and the government; other economic policy tools emerged in addition 
to monetary policy tools which alone were now considered inadequate. This was 
in contrast to the earlier period when central banks were largely privately owned 
and controlled, many of them following the example of the Bank of England; the 
post-war period saw many of them become state owned and controlled. 
That also became true of the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which became 
wholly owned by the Federal Government, the Governor-General of which was 
required by the Bank's Act to appoint a nine-member Board of Directors. These 
comprised the Governor and Deputy Governor of the bank; at least two with 
connections in commerce and finance, two from industry and one from agriculture. 
Thus the policy of the Government had an upper hand, and prior approval of the 
Minister of Finance was required by the bank in the exercise of its powers. 
Nevertheless, a fair degree of independence was accorded to the bank through 
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excluding from its board civil servants and ministers; and employees, officials, 
directors and shareholders of commercial banks - which the central bank was to 
control. 
Since the bank was required to be the banker to the Federal and Territorial 
Governments, their accounts were transferred to it from commercial banks in 1957 
and 1960 in the case of the Federal Government and the Southern Rhodesia 
Government, respectively; for the Northern Rhodesia Government the transfer 
was effected in 1961 when the bank's branch was opened in Lusaka. In Nyasaland, 
even after a branch was opened in Blantyre in 1962 the ordinary accounts of the 
Government remained at commercial banks; here the development of close 
relationship between the Federal Central Bank and the government delayed 
because of the hostile attitude towards the concept of the Federation and uncertainty 
about its constitutional future. 
The Bank was required to act as agent for issuing and managing public debts of 
the Federal and Territorial governments and for administering exchange control. 
It was also authorised to lend to the Federal and Territorial Governments through 
advances and purchase of securities; but with legal limitations imposed on its 
lending only to the Federal Government, may be because it was thought that the 
federal central bank would have been less able to resist pressure from its parent 
Federal Government in the case of need for increased borrowing. Interestingly 
enough, in contrast to the governments of most developing countries in Africa, the 
Federal and Territorial Governments borrowed little from the Central bank, 
thereby hardly contributing to domestic inflationary pressures. 
The central bank had at its disposal a number of traditional monetary policy 
tools for controlling the activities of commercial banks and non-banks. Of these 
tools, the cash reserve ratio and the liquid assets ratio requirements were employed 
during its life time, as was the technique of announcing the central bank's 
minimum rate of discount/rediscount. However use of these tools had limited 
effect because of large reserves of commercial banks (which had access to facilities 
at their head offices abroad) and the openness of the federal economy and its 
balance of payments position. 
The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland wound up its business in 1964 and 
distributed its assets and liabilities among the successor central banks of the 
member countries. This followed the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1963. The main reason for dissolution was political opposition by 
indigenous people to the Federation. This was supported by economic reasons, the 
major one being unequal distribution of benefits from Federation, especially the 
substantial government budgetary gains by Southern Rhodesia, and to some extent 
Nyasaland, at the expense of Northern Rhodesia; as well as unequal industrial and 
commercial development favouring Southern Rhodesia. Each of the three 
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governments wanted to exercise its own direct control over the affairs of its own 
economy including foreign exchange reserves, exchange rates, credit expansion 
by banks and non-banks as well as money supply. The result was establishment 
of separate central banks in each of the three countries. 
It is also worth noting that the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland back in 1953 had also been based on political and economic reasons. 
Politically, the Federation was a strategy of expanding the dominion controlled by 
white settlers. Economically, it was argued that the Federation would: firstly 
contribute to the prosperity of member countries through enlarging a unified 
market; secondly provide insurance against income and revenue instability arising 
from output and price fluctuations of the few primary products on which each 
country depends; thirdly facilitate efficient joint economic planning thereby 
ensuring effective exploitation of the resources of the member countries; fourthly 
contribute to economic development through encouraging foreign capital inflows; 
fifthly, it was argued that the three economies were so complementary and 
interdependent that it was inevitable to have some form of political association. 
However, the list of principal economic aims of the Federation did not include 
monetary integration, some of which existed in practice as we have seen above. 
The present Common Monetary Area comprising South Africa, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Lesotho was preceded by the Rand Monetary Area which operated 
up to March 1986. For a long time before the Rand Monetary Area was formally 
established in March 1974, coins and notes of various currencies circulated in the 
Southern Africa area, introduced at different times by various parties consisting of 
European hunters, explorers and missionaries. The foregoing mix continued to 
circulate freely even when the British administration in each of the territories had 
promulgated various laws governing legal tender by the beginning of this century. 
As years passed, the Pound Sterling became the currency circulating in the 
Southern African area. It was succeeded by the South African Rand when the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa was established in 1921. This in turn was replaced 
by the South African Rand in 1960, again not only in South Africa but also in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, although without any formal agreement. This 
situation continued in these three countries even in their early years of independence 
from Britain; so that their combined area together with South Africa came to be 
commonly referred to as the 'rand area', which in effect was a unified monetary 
area with no restrictions on payments and movements of notes and coin of the 
South African Pound, the only currency in circulation then. 
The four countries' exchange controls continued to function under a wider 
agreement of Scheduled Territories, a term which replaced that of the Sterling 
Area in the UK Exchange Control Act of 1947. This wider arrangement consisted 
of most of the Commonwealth member countries, in each of which were established 
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compatible exchange controls and regulations, although they were not identical. 
To conserve scarce foreign exchange, the gold and dollar reserves of the Scheduled 
Territories were managed by the UK in a common pool in London, into which 
surpluses of net foreign exchange earning members were generally deposited and 
from which requirements of net foreign exchange spenders were met. In June, 
1972, the UK reclassified South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana as non-
scheduled territories and subjected them to UK exchange controls on capital 
movements. 
Consequently, in July 1972, South Africa' s regulations introduced the distinction 
between 'rand area' and the rest, thereby abandoning the distinction based on the 
Scheduled Area arrangement. Nationals of the other three countries were treated 
as residents of South Africa in respect of transactions with non-rand area countries. 
In principle, the three countries continued to exercise jurisdiction over their 
respective earlier exchange control arrangements, but in practice they co-operated 
with South Africa in exercising similar exchange controls to prevent loopholes 
experienced when they belonged to the Scheduled Territories arrangement. 
Almost all of their private overseas transfers were effected through commercial 
banks in Johannesburg so that problems hardly arose. 
The informal 'rand area' was formalised into the Rand Monetary Area on 20th 
March 1974 when the Rand Monetary Agreement was signed by the four countries 
namely South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; a result of the wish to 
regularise the status of the Rand following independence of the last three countries. 
In 1975 Botswana withdrew from the Agreement; the agreement allowed a free 
flow of currency between countries of the Area. South Africa agreed to pay 
compensation to Lesotho and Swaziland for allowing the circulation of the Rand 
in their countries; this was to be side by side with their respective national 
currencies (i.e. Loti and Lilangeni) which the agreement gave them the right to 
issue. However, the Loti and Lilangeni did not circulate in South Africa. 
Following the 1974 Agreement, the exchange rates between the Rand, Loti and 
Lilangeni were fixed at unity, without variation of the par value or around it being 
permitted. All the three currencies were to be mutually and unconditionally 
convertible into each other at the fixed exchange rate. To the new administrators 
in Swaziland and Lesotho, this had some advantage of relieving them from the 
need to decide on balance of payments and monetary policies. 
The 1974 Agreement was modified on 1st April 1986 through a new Trilateral 
Monetary Agreement which replaced the Rand Monetary Area with the Common 
Monetary Area, largely on the initiative of Lesotho and Swaziland following three 
macroeconomic developments perceived to exert adverse effects on their economies: 
(a) the external value of the Rand tended to be extremely variable and exhibited 
a downward trend; (b) the inflation rate in the three countries was typically higher 
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than in neighbouring countries, major trading countries in Europe and the U.S.A.; 
(c) the foregoing two developments compelled South Africa to re-introduce the 
financial rand, providing a more favourable rate for non-resident investors and a 
less favourable rate for withdrawals of capital from the country. The re-
introduction of the financial rand in 1985 led to the closure of the South African 
foreign exchange market for four days to 1st September 1985 to try to protect their 
external position. This in turn gave problems to financial transactions by Lesotho 
and Swaziland. According to the new agreement of April 1986 the Rand was no 
longer legal tender in Swaziland, which also reserved the right to introduce its own 
foreign exchange regime. Nonetheless the free flow of currency was retained 
between the Common Monetary Area countries, in all of which the rand continues 
to circulate. 
Appendix 2. Tables 
Table A.1 Exchange rates1 and exchange arrangements in Southern Africa, 30th June, 
1992 
Member (Country) 
Currency 
pegged 
to 
Exchange 
rate 
Exchange 
rate 
otherwise 
determined 
Angola (kwanza) 
Botswana (pula) 
Lesotho (loti) 
Malawi (kwacha) 
Mozambique (metical)2 
Namibia (rand)3 
Swaziland (lilangeni) 
Tanzania (shilling) 
Zambia (kwacha)2 
Zimbabwe (dollar) 
South Africa (rand)3 
US$ 
basket 
rand 
basket 
rand 
basket 
basket 
basket 
55,0 
2.0838 
1.00 
4.01929 
3,754.72 
1.00 
300.00 
4.958325 
2.7740 
160.878 
2.7720 
1 Market rates in currency units per U.S. dollar. 
2Adjusted according to a set of indicators. 
3Floating. 
Source: IMF Survey, October 26, 1992, p. 328. 
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Table A.2 
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Comparative exchange rate performance in SADC member states 1965-1990 
Year Lesotho Malawi Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
1965 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1966 98.83 101.61 100.20 90.90 138.85 99.7 
1967 96.31 101.89 98.64 105.04 150.26 102.37 
1968 96.82 114.69 100.37 111.27 196.37 100.5 
1969 96.29 110.69 99.86 139.32 208.15 100.9 
1970 93.53 127.90 97.83 128.87 205.01 101.5 
1971 103.89 131.93 109.09 141.41 197.72 114.8 
1972 88.72 127.06 96.50 152.66 176.44 96.9 
1973 80.50 141.25 92.04 169.07 243.83 112.3 
1974 85.76 175.64 102.99 173.97 202.08 121.1 
1975 95.75 164.59 113.94 183.14 266.06 141.3 
1976 84.17 153.15 94.31 211.26 245.23 140.2 
1977 91.39 194.27 105.93 223.47 225.31 135.3 
1978 93.12 164.38 103.12 215.28 180.11 125.9 
1979 91.73 145.72 102.28 273.56 217.93 112.0 
1980 87.38 127.60 99.90 307.83 165.85 114.1 
1981 99.23 160.58 118.43 377.16 165.31 110.3 
1982 85.81 142.04 104.35 398.79 228.57 116.7 
1983 102.84 121.24 118.71 402.55 206.31 93.9 
1984 122.45 167.57 143.39 314.78 161.96 102.5 
1985 119.70 160.39 146.22 319.07 80.14 100.7 
1986 103.66 139.72 120.79 195.55 55.46 90.6 
1987 108.37 144.34 126.53 113.56 98.77 80.6 
1988 113.02 146.33 135.71 96.03 135.25 99.6 
1989 77.88 162.96 92.51 97.09 128.50 114.9 
1990 80.02 175.51 90.91 104.03 113.46 124.6 
Note: Over 100 denotes overvaluation, under 100 denotes under-valuation, 100 denotes 
equilibrium of exchange rate. 
Source: PTA (1990), p. 29. These indices are ratios, in percentages, of the nominal exchange 
rate to the equilibrium exchange rate of each country, calculated by using the purchasing 
power parity. 
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Table A.3 State of exchange rate disparities between member states and required 
adjustments back to equilibrium 
Index of Adjustment Index of Adjustment 
Country undervaluation % Country overvaluation % 
Lesotho 80.2 24.97 Malawi 175.51 -43.02 
Swaziland 90.91 10.00 Tanzania 104.03 -03.87 
Zambia 113.46 -11.86 
Zimbabwe 124.61 -19.65 
Note: Over 100 denotes overvaluation, under 100 denotes undervaluation, 100 denotes 
equilibrium of exchange rate. 
Source: PTA (1990), p. 65. These ratios are indices are ratios, in percentage of the 
nominal exchange rate to the equilibrium exchagne rate, calculated by using the 
purchasing power parity. 
Table A.4 Estimated levels of stable Central Bank credit to central government 
Simulated Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP 
Country compare: present rate of 
1% 2% 3% credit expansion 
Lesotho 7.1% 7.3% 7.4% 22.1% 
Malawi 20.7% 20.8% 20.9% 14.8% 
Swaziland 21.3% 21.4% 21.5% -19.8% 
Tanzania 22.0% 22.1% 22.3% 27.3% 
Zambia 17.8% 17.8% 17.9% 27.8% 
Zimbabwe 10.2% 10.4% 10.6% 10.8% 
Note: Based on 1970-78 data, Inflation is assumed at 100% 
Source: PTA (1990), p. 69. 
Table A.5 Central Bank Credit to Central Government 
Values in millions of National Currencies 
1980 1981 1992 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Swaziland 
1. 15% of Previous Year's Revenue 19 22 20 27 27 32 35 37 49 
2. Actual Credit 5 6 7 7 20 26 32 12 4 
3. Difference 14 16 13 20 7 6 3 25 45 
Zambia 
1. 15% of Previous Year's Revenue 89 115 121 126 152 164 234 454 623 
2. Actual Credit 1183 1394 1657 2009 2419 5327 6699 3966 6457 
3. Difference -1094 -1279 -1536 -1883 -2267 -5163 -6465 -3912 -5834 
Zimbabwe 
1. 15% of Previous Year's Revenue 92 124 169 227 280 305 320 378 441 
2. Actual Credit 122 197 339 290 165 52 92 308 275 
3. Difference -30 -73 -167 -63 115 268 228 70 166 
Note: Simulated at 15% of Previous Year's Fiscal Revenue 
Source: PTA (1990), p. 70. 
Notes 
1. Southern African Development Community consisting of Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
2. Membership consists of Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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